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Abstract 
 
 Although not a formal pricing consideration, gap risk or hedging errors are the 
norm of derivatives businesses. Starting with the gap risk during a margin period of risk 
of a repurchase agreement (repo), this article extends the Black-Scholes-Merton option 
pricing framework by introducing a reserve capital approach to the hedging error's 
irreducible variability. An extended partial differential equation is derived with two new 
terms for expected gap loss and economic capital charge, leading to the gap risk 
economic value adjustment and capital valuation adjustment (KVA) respectively.  
Practical repo pricing formulae is obtained showing that the break-even repo rate 
decomposes into cost of fund and economic capital charge in KVA. At zero haircut, a 
one-year term repo on main equities could command a capital charge as large as 50 basis 
points for a 'BBB' rated borrower. 
  
Key words: repo pricing, Black-Scholes model, economic capital, hedging error, gap 
risk, margin period of risk, capital valuation adjustment, KVA. 
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1. Introduction 
 Option pricing lays its foundation on the construction of a trading portfolio in 
both underlying stock and money market investment such that the option is dynamically 
hedged. A short option on a stock modeled on geometric Brownian motion, for example, 
can be self-financed and hedged perfectly so that there is no hedging error. The option 
and its hedging portfolio therefore contribute zero market risk capital to its trading book. 
When the stock price is modeled as a jump diffusion process, the jumps in the option 
price can't be hedged. Consequentially the delta-hedged option portfolio has a hedging 
error. By assuming non-systemic jumps and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)'s 
applicability, Merton (1976) shows that this error will average out to zero and derives a 
mixed differential-difference Black-Scholes type equation and an option pricing formula 
with lognormally distributed jumps. Knowing the challenges in CAPM's empirical 
testing, Merton resorts to the Arbitrage Pricing Theory to derive the same, thanks to the 
hedging portfolios diversification argument. The hedging error's variability (and thus risk 
capital) has no pricing impact. In incomplete market theories developed later, a hedging 
strategy can be optimized to reduce the variance of the hedged portfolio (Duffie and 
Richardson 1991, Karoui and Quenez 1995). The residual variance, however, had never 
been a formal part of pricing considerations until the multifaceted post crisis reform of 
the regulatory risk capital framework arrived.  
While a quick and practical response is to incorporate the strengthened regulatory 
capital requirements into existing derivatives pricing and valuation models, a 
fundamental revisit of derivatives pricing theories is in order. Post-crisis derivative 
pricing and risk management research has in fact advanced into a new regime where 
efforts from both academia and the industry have focused on studying secondary risk 
factors or frictions such as counterparty risk, funding, liquidity, and capital cost. These 
under-appreciated factors become sources of arbitrage barriers and challenge the 
foundation of the no-arbitrage belief. While Hull and White (2014) argue that the risk 
neutral price remains the best estimate of derivative’s fair value, Crepey (2011) questions 
whether the “one-price” rule is still valid and discusses many subtleties and recognize the 
need of redeveloping models from scratch. 
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Naturally, a revisionist approach is to expand the classic option hedging setting to 
accommodate these costs and re-derive the celebrated Black-Scholes-Merton partial 
differential equations (PDE).  Burgard and Kjaer (2011, 2013) incorporate counterparty 
credit risk into the PDE framework2 and propose to treat own default risk hedging errors 
as part of a derivatives desk's funding strategies and capture funding costs under FVA 
and DVA. The hedging errors are, however, results of an assumed exogenous recovery 
rate, for example 40%, and an outdated risk-free close-out amount calculation. Lou (2013) 
shows the hedging error can be eliminated by recognizing the endogenous recovery rate 
of par when the derivative economy is properly segregated such that, ignoring the gap 
risk, the residual cash flow of the economy can pay off the debt3 issued to finance the 
derivative and its hedges. Assuming the market value recovery, which is more closely 
aligned to current close-out amount protocol, an economic neutral hedge by the liability-
side counterparty is presented that serves as an extension of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
framework to uncollateralized derivatives (Lou 2015).  
While counterparty credit risk and funding costs are met with CVA (credit 
valuation adjustment) and FVA (funding valuation adjustment), whether cost of capital 
should be accounted as a cost of business or a new valuation adjustment becomes a 
heated topic. Green, Kenyon and Dennis (2014) add a regulatory capital term to Burgard 
and Kjaer's PDE to introduce capital valuation adjustment (KVA), which Prampolini and 
Morini (2015) find that replacing the junior bond with equity would also arrive at.  
In this article, we set out to model and price hedging error associated with gap 
risk incurred during a margin period of risk (MPR), or MPR gap risk. Margin period gap 
risk is common and pronounced in securities financing transactions and centrally or non-
centrally cleared OTC derivatives. Specifically, we define the MPR gap risk as the 
collateral market price gap decline during the MPR resulting in loss to repo principal 
after borrower default settlement. For all practical purposes, we consider the MPR gap 
risk to be unhedgeable, to have a non-reducible variance, and to be fully warehoused. In 
                                                 
2 Counterparty's default risk is fully hedged by shorting the counterparty's zero recovery zero coupon bond, 
which has no diffusion component in its price dynamics. So counterparty credit risk is in fact not 
completely hedged should we consider the credit spread risk. 
3  The funding cost on issued notes could be made higher to compensate for the gap risk, including 
inefficiencies in default settlements.  
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the standard market risk capital framework, capital is then required and cost of capital 
will occur and has to be part of pricing and valuation of derivatives.  
The main contribution of this article is to introduce a measure of economic capital 
corresponding to the hedging error and build capital financing cost into the Black-
Scholes-Merton pricing framework. By choosing securities financing transactions where 
sufficient levels of haircuts essentially eliminate counterparty risk and derivatives 
funding risk, economic capital impact on pre-trade pricing and post-trade valuation can 
be well isolated and analyzed. Section 2 expands the Black-Scholes option economy for 
securities financing economy, its funding structure and hedging instruments. Replication 
portfolio and cash flow analysis are set up with the self-financing condition derived. 
Section 3 defines economic capital and capital valuation adjustment and links up with the 
repo economic model (Lou 2016) and derives repo fair value and break-even spread 
formulae. Section 4 shows repo pricing with examples. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling a Segregated Securities Financing Economy 
 
Suppose a fictitious bank B (lender) and its customer C (borrower) enter into a 
repurchase agreement (repo) where the bank lends an amount Np at interest rate rp to C. C, 
in turn, sells stock to B at haircut h and will purchase it back at time T. Let Vt be the pre-
termination repo fair value. Write Vt= Np + υt, where υt is the fair value of the embedded 
derivative in the repo, likely positive or negative. The bank has in place a hedging 
strategy t in the underlying stock which is traded at price St. Economically, the reverse 
repo is a bilateral lending agreement that can be treated as a bilateral defaultable 
derivative on the stock with counterparty risk. Our intention is to segregate this lending 
activity into a standalone economy so as to isolate the hedging error. 
 The economy operates within a capital market consisting of three classes of 
investors: the equity investor, the capital financer, and the liquidity provider, each having 
different risk preferences. For example, when underwriting a loan, these investors take on 
the equity, mezzanine (mezz), and the senior tranches respectively, which are cut to fit 
the expected loss (EL) of the loan, the unexpected loss (UL) corresponding to a given q-
tile, and the remaining size of the loan. A loan for instance can be truncated into a 3% 
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equity, 15% mezz, and 82% senior pieces corresponding to 3% EL and 15% UL on 18% 
VaR given 99.9 percentile confidence interval. 
 The liquidity provider looks for opportunities to invest its cash in near credit risk-
free products for a finite term earning interest at the rate rf. As the credit risk premium is 
minimal, the spread over the risk-free rate r reflects the cost of fund (CoF) or liquidity 
premium of the investment. The equity investor takes any residual loss or gain of the loan 
in the form of interest margin or excess spread4. The capital financer demands for the use 
of their capital a continuous dividend payout at a yield of rk, while standing by to absorb 
losses beyond EL.   
A 1 year term loan is now tranched in size at C for capital (mezz), SR for liquidity 
provider, and 1-C-SR for equity, the loan originator's pricing sheet can be simply, 
NetCpn = C*rk + SR*rf  + IntMargin, where C is set to unexpected loss, 1-C-SR equals 
to expected loss (EL), expressed as percentages of the lending amount. Intuitively the 
earned interest on the loan needs to cover expected loss, capital financing cost, and the 
liquidity cost. NetCpn is nominal coupon netted off origination fee and other 
considerations such as operating costs and profit margins. The IntMargin is supposed to 
be sufficiently large to cover EL and is held by the equity investor. 
Such a market structure, while rather foreign to derivatives pricing literature, is 
quite standard in insurance industry. In life insurance policy underwriting, for instance, 
insurers collect sufficient insurance premium to cover the policy pool's projected 
expected loss in the form of an economic reserve. Initial equity and retained earnings are 
captured in a special purpose financing vehicle that's used to pay any deficiency of the 
economic reserve. And a redundant reserve account is partially or fully funded that is last 
to be tapped into to pay insurance claims, much like the senior piece of the loan 
syndication.  
In the classic Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option pricing framework, there is no 
need for such a capital market setup, as the dynamically replicated option portfolio as a 
whole has zero expected loss and zero unexpected loss (Shreve, 2004). In fact, we have 
zero equity tranche since EL=0, and mezz tranche as UL=0, and zero senior tranche 
                                                 
4 Interest margin is a loan terminology while excess spread is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) 
terminology. A loan syndicated with three classes of investors can be considered as a single asset CLO.  
   
6 
 
(SR=0) as it is self-financed and there is no need for a liquidity provider. One could 
anticipate that when the secondary risk factors are considered rather than ignored, EL and 
UL would exist and need to be included in the option pricing framework. The liquidity 
provider steps in because funding is no longer risk free. As an exploratory note, we adopt 
the BSM framework for securities financing transactions where funding and capital 
factors outweigh primary risks such as stock prices.  
  
2.1 Accounts Setup 
 We start with introducing a number of accounts associated with the bilateral 
defaultable option economy (Lou 2013) and add other necessary components to the 
economy.  
 Bank account: The segregated economy’s only investment option is a cash 
deposit account, with balance Mt ≥0, earning the risk-free rate r(t). 
 Stock financing account: Stock financing is accessible in either repo or sec 
lending form. Assuming the reverse repo is long delta, so shares are borrowed 
from a sec lender to hedge the repo.  
 
Let hs be the haircut such that the economy needs to post cash collateral of 
Ls=(1+hs)∆S to the sec lender, hs >0. The sec lender gives the borrower an interest rebate 
at a rate of rs while the borrower pays a manufactured dividend if any to the lender. The 
difference between the rebate and the risk-free rate is stock’s borrowing cost. The margin 
account is revaluated and margined daily. 
 Repo principal account: This account represents the funding source of the 
lending amount of Np. This is from a liquidity provider who charges a cost of fund 
rf for the use of liquidity. 
 Economic capital reserve account: This is a segregated reserve account, with its 
sole purpose to absorb any potential losses should the borrower default and 
collateral upon liquidation is not sufficient to pay off the loan from the liquidity 
provider. The segregated economy requires a reserve balance Nc ≥0 deposited 
from the capital financier and is responsible for making dividend payment at the 
rate of rk. The reserve is set aside in a separate bank account, earning interest at r. 
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 Debt account: The segregated economy’s unsecured cash raising option for the 
remaining cash flow needs is a short term debt issued and recorded in a debt 
account with balance Nt ≥0. The debt account has a unit price or par and is rolled 
at a short rate rN(t), rN(t)>r(t).  
 
In Lou (2013) the pair of (Mt, Nt) is used to capture the funding asymmetry 
between deposit and borrowing, satisfying Mt∙Nt=0, so that cash flow generated in the 
economy would be used to pay down the debt first since rN>r. Here Mt∙Nt=0 is not 
enforced. The residual cash flow of the transaction is an eligible claim paying resource 
for this class of notes. 
 
 Repo margin account: Repo terms are governed by the Master Repurchase 
Agreement (MRA) published by the Bond Market Association or the Global 
Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) by the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA). From counterparty credit risk mitigation point of view, repo 
principal Np is collateralized by the shares of stock.  
  
 Derivatives based securities financing transactions such as Total Return Swap 
(TRS) or Credit Default Swap (CDS) are governed by ISDA Master Agreement where 
the derivatives mark-to-market is collateralized under the Credit Support Annex (CSA). 
In securities financing transactions effected by TRS or CDS, the asset bought separately 
by the lender serves to collateralize its lending. 
 
 Derivative collateral account: Under both MRA and GMRA, a repo's accrued 
interest is part of the daily margin while the present value of the funding interest 
is not. When it is placed in a trading book, the pv of the repo interest is therefore 
uncollateralized. Following the liability-side pricing theory (Lou 2015), a 
fictitious collateral account Lt for υt. The account Lt will earn the borrower's 
senior unsecured rate rc if υt≥0, or the bank's own rate rb if υt<0, i.e., the earned 
rate on Lt is )0)(()()0)(()()(  tItrtItrtr cbe  . 
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 With derivatives based SFTs, the same collateral account Lt is used here but it 
pays only the risk-free rate r when a full CSA is in place. Obviously if there is no CSA, 
the counterparty's rate applies. Let Lt denote the market value of collateral for υt, posted 
by party C to B if positive, or by B to C if negative. For simplicity, we assume collateral 
is full, i.e., υt= Lt.  
 Collateral for V is therefore bifurcated into a repo margin account that handles the 
repo principal and the derivative collateral account. The economy only accepts or posts 
cash collaterals at zero haircut, and pays or receives re or r on the balance Lt. Furthermore 
the collateral process is efficient, prompt and never over-collateralized. 
 All rates are short rates and determined exogenously. rb and rc carry credit risk, 
while rf - r is a funding basis similar to the bond-CDS basis. rN is a placeholder and it 
could be different from rb if the bank raises money other than from its senior unsecured 
rank. 
 
2.2 Wealth and Financing Equation 
 Having listed the economy's various accounts, we now proceed to define the 
wealth of the SFT economy denoted by πt, t≤T.     
The repurchase agreement could terminate prior to its scheduled maturity on 
either party’s default. To facilitate discussion of economic capital, we assume repo 
collateral (the purchased securities) is segregated and not rehypotheticated. The borrower 
can reclaim its securities should the lender default so that the lender does not benefit from 
its own default. It follows that only the borrower's default needs to be considered. This is 
consistent with standard loan analysis. 
Write the economy's wealth πt as follows, 
 
),)(1( psttt NNLLSVM      )1(  
 
where Гt = I(τ≤t) is C's default indicator, τ the default time of C. Accounts excluding the 
cash in the bank account are conditional to no termination, i.e., Гt =0, so that all relevant 
quantities are to be understood as pre-default values. To shorten the formula, all t-
subscripts have been dropped. Following the reduced form modeling approach, we 
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further assume the default time is a stopping time having an adapted intensity process λ 
defined in the usual probability triplet (Ω,P,₣). Mt and Nt are non-negative adapted 
stochastic processes. 
At t=0, the wealth reduces to 00000 NShM s  . Let M0=0 and N0=hs0S0 
so that π0 =0, i.e., the initial capital of the economy starts out at zero. Note that hsS ≥0 as 
when >0, hs ≥0 for sec lending and if <0, hs≤0 for repo. If the debt account is pegged 
to the residual stock financing amount, Nt=hstSt, the wealth of the pre-default economy 
reduces to the balance of the bank account, πt=Mt. 
For τ>t≥0, during the normal course of business, the bank pursues a trading 
strategy to hedge the embedded derivative and performs all necessary funding and credit 
support functions stipulated by the margin agreement. Excess cash is deposited into the 
bank account, debt, if any, is serviced and rolled as needed. Interests are collected and 
paid.  
Specifically,  over a small interval of time dt, on the hedge front, shorting or 
rebalancing dΔ more shares of stock at the price of St+dSt will see cash inflow of 
dΔt( St+dSt) amount. Since stock shares are borrowed, additional money has to be posted 
to the sec lender. The debt account pays interest amount rNNtdt and rolls into new 
issuance of Nt+dNt. The bank account accrues interest amount rMtdt. On the collateral 
side, party C posts additional collateral amount dLt in cash while being paid of interest 
amount reLtdt. The repo principal account pays out rfNpdt and the EC reserve account 
dividends out an amount of rkNcdt while receiving interest of rNcdt. Any increase in repo 
principal dNp is funded by the liquidity provider. 
The wealth equation is written with all default effects implicitly built into the 
bank account. If a default happens before T, i.e., τ<T, trades will have been settled 
without delay and resulting cash flow will be swiped into the bank account which 
becomes the only account active till T. Mt may exhibit a jump at τ as a result of default 
settlement. Put everything together, the economy’s pre-default financing equation, 
t<min(T, τ), follows, 
 
))(
)()(1(
dtLrdLLdtrdLdtNrr
NpdtrNdtrdNdSSddtNrrMdtdM
ssseck
fNppt


      )2(  
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Noting that Ls=(1+hs) ΔS and L= υ, collect terms to arrive at 
 
))())((1( SdtrdtrdtNrrdSddtNrrrMdtdM seckpfpt         )3(  
 
where sNsss hrhrr  )1( is the economy's effective stock financing rate.  
Upon the borrower's default at τ, the hedges can be unwound without loss as stock 
trades in established exchanges and counterparty risk is negligible. The stock financing 
account for the delta hedge also unwinds promptly with the overcollateralized amount of 
hτSτ returned to pay down the issued note Nτ. So no net cash flow arises from stock 
hedge account τSτ, stock financing account Ls, and the issued debt account N. 
Furthermore the embedded derivative υt offsets with the derivative collateral account L.  
On the repo, the lending amount at time τ is Np(τ), with a collateral market value 
of Np(τ)/(1-h). Here we assume that prior to the default time, i.e., at τ-, there is no missed 
margin. Effectively we treat the first missed margin call same as default. This is a 
simplified default timeline for modeling purposes. See Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol 
(2016) for a nice discussion of the margin and default timeline. Assuming that stock 
collateral is liquidated at the end of the margin period of risk u at a liquidation discount g 
representing a market liquidity premium, repo margin account would settle at an amount 
of ))(
1
1
),(min( 


p
u
p N
S
S
h
g
N 


. The settlement amount could result in a shortfall to the 
repo principal amount. The lender's loss is given by 
 
,)
1
1
1)(()1()( 





S
S
h
g
NRul up           )4(  
 
where R is the applicable recovery rate of party C.  
Between default time τ and loss settlement at τ+u, the interest to the liquidity 
provider could keep on accruing. Accrual is ignorable for now as the accrual period is 
capped by MPR which is short, typically 5 business days for repos. Dividend to the 
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capital financer can be suspended at the point of default, awaiting for default settlement. 
So the only cash flow during the MPR is the bank account accruing at r. 
As all accounts match up except the bank account, the wealth of the economy 
prior to completion of the default settlement is the balance of the bank account. If a loss 
has occurred, it will be deducted from the balance. If the balance should show a negative 
value, the segregated reserve account Nc will be drawn to cover the shortfall. To the 
extent that loss does not exceed Nc, the principal amount Np is without loss and fully 
returned to the liquidity provider. Np could still suffer loss, albeit at a negligible tail loss 
probability, say 0.1% when the confidence interval for capital is set up at 99.9%. Here we 
assume that this tail loss is priced in Np's interest rate and absorbed by the liquidity 
provider. 
 
2.3 PDE Derivation 
 Including the lagged default settlement, the differential wealth equation at time t, 
t≥u, can be written as follows, 
 
))()))(((1(
)()(
SdtrdtrdtNrrdSddtNrrt
tlutddtrd
seckpfp
tt




 )5(  
The dГ term records default cash flow settlement at time t if t=τ+u.  Assume that 
the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with its real world return μ and 
volatility σ, dS= μSdt + σSdW. Applying Ito’s lemma to υt, setting up delta hedge, and 
assuming deterministic short rates and default intensity, it follows, 
 
dttElNrrNrrr
S
S
S
Sr
t
dttEltlutddtrd
ckpfpest
tt
))()()()(1(
)()1()()(
2
2
22
2
1 















` )6(  
 
where )]([)( utlEtEl t  . The second term on the right hand side is a compensator to 
the first term, assuming that the loss at t+u is independent from the default, i.e., no 
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specific wrong way risk. Setting the dt term on the right to zero results in the following 
PDE,  
 
0)()()(
2
2
22
2
1 








ckpfpes NrrtElNrrr
S
S
S
Sr
t




  )7(  
 
Equation (7) is the governing PDE for the fair price of the repo embedded 
derivative and thus repo fair value. The first four terms on the left hand side are the same 
as in the liability-side pricing of derivatives (Lou 2015). The fifth term is the repo 
financing earned income, the sixth is the charge off or time decay of the expected loss 
during the MPR, and the last term is the cost of financing economic capital due to the gap 
risk. The last two terms are absent from typical FVA PDEs, e.g., Burgard and Kjaer 
(2013), as the gap risk is not considered there. The sixth term distinguishes from other 
KVA PDEs such as Green et al (2014) where a direct charge of cost of capital is exerted 
on regulatory capital without modeling gap risk and its economic value. 
The net wealth of the segregated economy, πt, represents a hedging error resulting 
from the gap loss l(t) upon a jump-to-default event. In the next section, we pinpoint the 
economic capital corresponding to the hedging error for an SFT economy, which enters 
the above PDE but has yet to be specified. 
 
3. Measuring and Managing Hedging Error with Economic Capital 
 
Now suppose that the embedded derivative fair value process υt satisfies the PDE 
(7), the hedging error term (6) becomes 
 
dttElulddtrddA tuttt  )()1()(   .   )8(  
 
For time s>0, dAt can be integrated
5 to get, 
 
                                                 
5 Because of the delayed settlement, the jump term needs to be integrated from u to s+u, while the survival 
term from 0 to s. 
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 
s
tss dttEllA
0
)()1()(  .     )9(  
 
Assuming default settlement loss is independent of the jump-to-default event, it 
can be easily verified that E[As]=0 and As is a martingale with A0=0 as, for s>t>u, 
conditional on no default at time t, t<τ,  
 
))()()(
^



s
t
ts dyyEllstIAA .    )10(  
 
As can be interpreted as the net hedging loss accumulation up to time s, excluding 
its risk-free growth in the bank account. A natural way to look at the economic loss and 
capital requirement is to consider the terminal loss AT.  
 
3.1 Determining Economic Capital 
 Let's examine AT's VaR measure given a q-tile, 
 
}1)Pr(:),0[inf{ qxAxVaR TA  .     )11(  
 
where the tail distribution of AT is given by 
 
 
T
T dPdttElxlxA
0 0
)()])(()(Pr[)Pr( 

    )12(  
 
Because E[AT] is zero, economic capital is the same as VaRA, i.e., Nc=VaRA. 
Obviously, VaRA can be defined at a forward time t, assuming party C has not defaulted 
yet by then.  
VaRA is for a fixed time, maturity T, while the reserve account Nc(t) is set up 
starting from time zero. A simple adjustment is to discount it back, i.e., Nc(t)=VaRA* 
β(T)/β(t), where 
t
rdst
0
)exp()( . This definition naturally fits with hedging error 
minimization schemes at some fixed time horizon such as Duffie and Richardson (1991). 
   
14 
 
Alternatively hedging errors can be examined and minimized locally. Multiply the 
risk-free deflator βt to equation (8) and integrate from t to T to arrive 
at, 
T
t
ssttTT dA . Because the deflator is continuous and As is a martingale, the 
discounted hedging error is also a martingale. On a no-default path where Гs=0 and 
dГs=0 for t≤s≤T, the path integral gives 
 
 
T
t
sttTT dsusEl .)(        )13(  
  
This shows that the discounted wealth of the economy accumulates continuously 
over time on a no-default path, at the rate of default intensity times the expected loss 
during the MPR. 
On a default path with default time <T, it jumps due to default settlement that 
could lead to a loss, and the path integral becomes 
 
 

 
t
sttTT uldsusEl )()(     )14(  
 
Note that we always have  TT for <T.  
Now we can define the loss of economic value at time t for the full remaining 
duration of the economy and its VaR as follows, 
 
T
t
T
tt 


 ˆ  
}1)ˆPr(:inf{ qxRxVaR tt   .     )15(  
 
Because E[ tˆ ] is zero, Nc(t)=VaRt. This definition is simpler in form and used for 
equation (7). When a loss is realized and the wealth is not sufficient to pay the loss, 
money in the reserve account will be drawn to cover loss. On an expectation basis, the 
wealth growth is sufficient to meet the loss, so economic capital is indeed for unexpected 
losses.  
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If the asset price dynamics do not depend on the default of the borrower, the tail 
probability of tˆ  becomes 
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where dPt(τ) is probability of default at time τ as seen on time t, i.e., forward default 
curve,  
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3.2 New Valuation Adjustments GAP_EVA and KVA 
 With economic capital defined, the PDE (eqt.7) is fully specified. Applying 
Feynman-Kac theorem and noting υ(T)=0 arrive at the pricing formulae, 
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where sp=rp-rf is the liquidity spread and sk=rk-r is the capital charge spread. Let υ* be the 
risk-free price without consideration of counterparty risk and the gap risk on the MPR,  
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Let U(t)=υ*(t)-υ(t) be the valuation adjustment to υ*, given by  
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In addition to the counterparty risk adjustment (CRA), we now find that capturing 
gap risk introduces two new fair value adjustments, namely the gap risk value adjustment 
(GAP-EVA) and economic capital value adjustment (KVA), reflecting the economic 
value added and the financing cost of the gap-risk capital, respectively. There is no 
overlap between CRA and KVA as the latter is dedicated to gap risk in MPR which is not 
present in CRA. Note that GAP-EVA is new compared to other KVA researches (Green 
et al 2014), where KVA is based on regulatory capital instead of economic capital as is 
the case here. 
If expected loss El and economic capital Nc(t) are computed exogenously, for 
instance, by means of referencing a standardized schedule, the PDE can be solved by 
finite difference methods. Decomposition of CRA into bilateral, coherent CVA and FVA 
can be done by solving the PDE with shifts in each parties’ synthetic or cash curves (Lou 
2015).  
Because KVA itself is part of the fair value, the formulae for KVA is recursive in 
general. An implementation directly calculating KVA however risks to have open IR01 
that could attract capital in the same way as FVA when defined imprecisely. 
 
3.3 Repo Formulae 
 PDE (7) specifies precisely repo fair value's dependence on the stock price, in the 
same fashion as an option. The general understanding and business practice, however, 
don't normally treat repos as derivatives because of the presence of significant haircuts, 
daily margin and covenants, especially for non-cusip based repo financing facilities that 
would forestall asset price dependency. In fact, if υt is not a function of S, PDE (7) 
reduces to an ordinary differential equation, 
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d
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When Np and El are constant in time, and if Nc is set to a constant, e.g., the average 
capital during a carrying period, with constant λ, the repo fair value formula is found by 
solving equation (20), 
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where apv is the borrower's risky discounted annuity. For pre-trade pricing, by setting υt 
to zero, we obtain the break-even repo formula, 
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We now see in equations (21&22) the economic capital charge intuitively. 
Equation (22) in particular formalizes what street traders have been doing when adding a 
regulatory capital charge to cost of fund rf, together with an interest margin for profit, to 
arrive their repo rates. El and Nc are provided by a haircut model that considers the joint 
dynamics of collateral asset and borrower credit, for instance, Lou (2016), where 
correlation between the asset return and the credit spread is shown to have only marginal 
impact. This is due to daily margining and a short MPR. Consequently there is not a 
strong practical need to introduce stochastic default intensity. If the borrower’s credit 
spread is deterministic or stochastic but independent of the asset price process, then EL 
and EC can be computed as a deterministic function of time t, followed by repo fair value 
and valuation adjustments, by solving ODE (20).  
Of course for constant position securities financing transactions, such as a TRS on 
a fixed number of shares of stock or fixed notional of bond, the full PDE applies. 
Alternatively, a repo can be seen as a form of counterparty credit derivatives and 
be priced following the conventional credit derivatives risk-neutral pricing approach. 
From a credit derivatives perspective, the lender sells a funded protection to the 
borrower6. Briefly, let β(t) be the applicable discount factor, the net present value (npv) 
of the loss, or default present value (dpv), is given by, 
 
                                                 
6 If the borrower defaults and the lender suffers a loss after a repo settlement, the borrower's estate can be 
viewed as if having taken the opposite, i.e., benefitted from not having to pay back the full principal 
borrowed. 
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 The reverse repo is effectively a floating rate note on a rate index, commonly 
LIBOR for tenors of 1 month or longer. The index part of the repo interest rate gets back 
to par when discounted at the same index curve. The present value of a unit spread, or 
annuity denoted by apv, is given by ,])()([
0
T
dttQtEapv  where Q(t) is party C's 
survival probability and the annuity is computed on a unit notional, suitable for a repo 
funding facility. The net present value of the repo (npv) is then npv=1-dpv+sp*apv where 
sp is the repo spread. 
 The pair of dpv and apv are essentially what the conventional credit derivatives 
pricing technique brings about. For a repo, however, these are not materially relevant, for 
dpv is very small due to the presence of significant haircuts and apv is very close to T 
when T≤1 year, unless with extreme short term discount rate and low quality credit 
counterparty.  What matters to repos are cost of fund and how much capital is used at 
what cost, both of which are missing from the above. This shows again the inability of 
the risk-neutral pricing theory to capture gap risk and economic capital. 
Lou (2016) presents a repo haircuts model and a companion economic capital 
model linking for the first time haircuts and economic capital to collateral security's price 
dynamics and borrower's credit spread dynamics. The exposure of an SFT is made 
equivalent to a secured term loan to a wholesale counterparty. The economic capital 
model takes into account asset risk, credit risk, wrong way risk, and market liquidity risk. 
General wrong way risk (WWR) is modeled by correlation between the asset return and 
the credit spread. The specific WWR is captured by a jump-on-default liquidation 
discount. Economic capital is defined as the unexpected loss taken either as the VaR or 
expected shortfall minus the expected loss. Historically estimated double exponential 
jump diffusion model shows that the regulatory capital undercuts economic capital in a 
risk-on range of haircuts and overstates economic capital in a low economic risk range.  
As expected, the general WWR is weak and negligible, because of the frequent 
margining and the MPR is short. Consequently there is not a strong practical need to 
   
19 
 
introduce stochastic default intensity. If the borrower credit spread is deterministic, then 
EL and EC can be computed as a deterministic function of time t. Repo fair value and 
valuation adjustment can be computed straightforwardly. If a dynamic spread such as the 
log-Ornstein-Uhlenbeck default intensity model is used and is independent of the asset 
price process, EL and EC can be computed separately and plugged into the fair value 
formula to arrive at repo fair value.  
Note that the PDE is derived assuming a geometric Brownian motion. When stock 
price follows a jump-diffusion process, the PDE would involve fair value jumps 
corresponding to jumps in stock prices, and become a partial integral differential 
equation. The fair value expectation formula and valuation adjustments however remain 
valid as the jumps are reflected in the probability measure under which the expectation is 
taken.  
For collateralized OTC derivatives, margin period of risk exists and initial margin 
is called upon as a reserve. PDE (7) still applies, with repo principal term dropped out, 
once El and Nc for the gap risk are established for the OTC derivatives book. Needless to 
say, economic and regulatory capital requirements, and thus KVA, must be computed at a 
book level. The capital pricing analysis could be extended appropriately, though 
computational concerns naturally follow. These are left for future research.   
 
4. Repo Pricing and Valuation Examples 
 
The model presented can be used for pre-trade repo pricing and post-trade 
valuation. With the former, traders often find themselves negotiating with clients either 
haircut levels, or repo rates, or both, and sometimes have to go with the flow in the 
market to be competitive. Naturally, low haircuts would need to be compensated with 
higher repo rates. Our model establishes exactly such a quantitative link between haircuts 
and repo rates via economic capital and its capital charge.  With the latter, while repos are 
typically treated on accrual accounting as secured loans for accounting purposes, repo 
fair valuation with sufficient sophistication has become a pressing need, especially for 
broker-dealers acting as financing intermediaries between hedge funds and money market 
   
20 
 
funds and treating repos as trading book positions that require fair value accounting.  
BASEL's new minimum market risk capital requirements specifically ask for measuring 
repos' counterparty credit risk. In this section, we demonstrate the model's applications. 
The sample repo is a one-year term repo earning 60 bp spread (repo rate minus 
cost of fund) with US main equities as collateral. SPX500 index is used as a proxy for the 
collateral asset. A double-exponential jump-diffusion model is estimated from daily price 
history of SPX500 from January 2008 to January 2013 for haircut and economic capital 
calculation (Lou 2016). It has an annualized diffusion volatility of 24%, up jump 
probability of 46%, averages 3.2 jumps during an MPR of 10 trading days, average up 
jump size of 0.59%, and average down jump size of 0.78%. The borrower is a 'BBB' 
party with its 5 year CDS traded at 250 bp level. 
 Suppose client inquiries are at three haircuts, 0%, 5% and 10%. repo fair value 
and valuation adjustments are shown in Table 1. KVA strikes out and dominates other 
adjustments. As expected, GAP-EVA is not a factor and can be dropped from the repo 
pricing formula (eqt. 20). CRA (CVA plus FVA) is very small as the counterparty credit 
risk is already mitigated by repo margining. 
  
Table 1. Fair value and valuation adjustments in running spread (bp) of the sample one 
year reverse repo on SPX500 under 0, 5%, and 10% haircuts. r=0.7%, basis 0.5%, 
1y CDS 1.88%. 
HC npv* CRA GAP-EVA KVA npv 
0 59.78 0.73 0.07 55.51 3.47 
5% 59.78 0.73 0.01 26.98 32.05 
10% 59.78 0.73 0.00 4.09 54.96 
 
In pre-trade pricing, the break-even earned spread can be solved by setting npv to 
zero, or equivalently by adding CRA, GAP-EVA and KVA. At 10% haircut, it will be 
4.82 bp. If the client wants to trade at a lower haircut, say 5%, the break-even increases to 
27.72 bp, exactly showing the tandem effect between haricut and repo pricing.  
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Intuitively, because repo tenors are short and risks embedded are similar to gap 
risk in nature, repo valuation given sufficient haircut levels shall reduce to taking the 
present value of the repo spread. The case of 10% haircut in Table 1 is a good example as 
its npv of 54.96 bp is close to the spread of 60 bp. 
As been made clear, this paper associates KVA to economic capital rather than 
regulatory capital (RC). Under BASEL III, a credit risk exposure is calculated to the 
extent the trade haircut is less than the required regulatory haircut. A capital charge could 
be calculated by applying the firm's return on equity (ROE) target to the regulatory 
capital, although use of regulatory capital in trade pricing is definitely not BASEL's 
original intention. Figure.1 shows a comparison of repo mark-to-market with a capital 
charge collected on EC and RC, when traded at haircuts ranging from zero to 20%. The 
most noticeable difference lies in the low haircut (thus more risky) region, where MTM 
with RC is significantly over-valued than MTM with EC, because RC is significantly 
lower than EC. In particular, at zero haircut, pv with EC is about 3.47 bp while pv with 
RC is 36.42 bp. This observation is important for derivatives (e.g. TRS) based securities 
financing which is often conducted at zero haircut. This shows that KVA based on RC 
could distort true trade economics and valuation. 
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Figure 1. Repo MTM with cost of economic capital (labelled 'EC-pv') compared with 
regulatory capital (labelled 'RC-pv') vs haircuts. 1y repo, 60 bp repo spread, 10% 
ROE, and rc= 3.1%. 
 
Economic capital tends to decay through time as the remaining maturity of the 
trade shortens7. Figure 2 shows projected economic capital (measured with expected 
shortfall) for the sample repo trade. With zero haircut, EC remains elevated across the 
full duration, only tapering off as it approaches maturity. At 5% haircut, EC reduces by 
about half. At 10% haircut, EC starts at 0.72% and declines almost linearly to zero at 
maturity.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Expected shortfall EC profile for a one year repo on SPX500 main equity under 
haircuts of 0%, 5%, and 10%. MPR=10 days. 
   
                                                 
7 Regulatory credit risk capital rule adopts a 1 year floor. 
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 Admittedly the pricing example given above is a standalone repo on stocks8. The 
discussion however is pertinent, for commercial banks and insurance companies typically 
have books sit on the lending side and don't enjoy any offsetting effect. For a dealer's 
active repo trading book, netting would kick in and affect EC calculation in principle, but 
the real effect could be limited as dealers tend to trade repos at high haircuts and run a 
back-to-back book.  
 Whether to include cost of capital in accounting fair value is debatable, as it is 
usually considered a cost outside of the revenue and income stream to which the fair 
value belongs. Others argue that, since it is charged by a party stepping in, it should be 
reflected in the fair value per IFRS 13's exit price based fair value measurement. In our 
view, the more pressing question is what it accounts for economically. KVA should be 
based on economic capital and account for hedging errors or unhedgeable risks, not 
unhedged risks. A measure of forward economic capital cost can always be calculated 
and kept as a valuation reserve to be released over time (similarly suggested in Albanese 
et al 2016), if not formally accepted into accounting fair value. 
 The computation above shows an ideal case where a second order risk effect 
outweighs first order. Traditional risk neutral pricing is correct only to the extent that 
complete hedges can be constructed or hedging errors can be perfectly diversified to nil. 
Otherwise, economic capital will result and cost of capital has to be evaluated and treated 
properly. Charging clients for capital cost is not only necessary but also an extension of 
existing derivatives pricing theories where prices are computed on expectation under a 
risk neutral measure without consideration of risk capital. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 Recognizing the hedging error during margin periods of risk is unhedgeable, we 
set out to define economic capital and incorporate the capital financing cost into 
derivatives pricing and valuation. The Black-Scholes-Merton pricing framework is 
                                                 
8 When the underlying security is a corp bond, the same analytics applies but bond maturity and volatility 
would have to be considered. Typically, a proxy bond price index of the same maturity bracket (say 3 to 5 
years) is picked and EC is computed. See Lou (2016) for more details. 
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extended to model the MPR gap risk and capital charge inherent in securities financing 
transactions. At zero haircut, a one-year repo with 10 day MPR on main equity could 
command capital charges as large as 50 bp for a 'BBB' rated borrower. Increased haircut 
reduces capital charges, e.g., to 4 bp at 10% haircut. This shows that for derivatives based 
funding transactions such as TRS transacted at zero haircuts and OTC derivatives 
collateral with insufficient haircuts, the cost of economic capital has to be captured in 
pricing. 
 To be more truthful and sensitive to actual economic risks associated with 
hedging errors or outright unhedgeable risks, we introduce KVA as cost of economic 
capital (instead of regulatory capital), and discover a new gap-risk added economic value 
adjustment (GAP-EVA). We also obtain practical repo pricing formulae where the break-
even repo rate decomposes into cost of fund, counterparty credit risk/GAP-EVA, and 
economic capital charge/KVA. With reasonable haircuts, GAP-EVA is very small and 
KVA dominates other valuation adjustments. 
 Our approach in establishing economic capital and its financing cost to manage 
hedging errors can be extended to margined OTC derivatives' MPR gap risk and finds 
applications in derivatives hedging and valuation in incomplete markets. These are left 
for future research.    
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